

Computational Interpretations of the Contraction Axiom

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Lisbon, 16 July 2005



Outline

- 1 Introduction
- 2 Herbrand Theorem
- 3 Functional Interpretations
- 4 Conclusion



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Purpose of the talk

Role of contraction in the computational analysis of proofs

$$A \rightarrow A \wedge A$$

equivalently

$$\frac{\Gamma, A, \dots, A \vdash B}{\Gamma, A \vdash B}$$

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- with classical logic (Herbrand's theorem)
- without classical logic (Functional interpretations)

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On Herbrand theorem

- **Contraction**

$$\frac{\Gamma, A, \dots, A \vdash B}{\Gamma, A \vdash B}$$

- **Stability**

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash \neg\neg A}{\Gamma \vdash A}$$

On Herbrand theorem

- **Contraction**

$$\frac{\Gamma, A, \dots, A \vdash B}{\Gamma, A \vdash B}$$

$$\vdash \exists x A$$

- **Stability**

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- Stability**

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash \neg\neg A}{\Gamma \vdash A}$$

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$$\begin{aligned} \vdash \exists x A &\Leftarrow \vdash \neg\neg \exists x A \\ &\Leftarrow \vdash \forall x \neg A \vdash \perp \end{aligned}$$



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Girard on contraction

When talking about the fact that LL has the existence property, despite identifying A with $(A^\perp)^\perp$, he writes:

“This exceptional behaviour of ‘nill’ (the linear negation) comes from the fact that A^\perp negates a single action of type A , whereas usual negation only negates some (unspecified) iteration of A , what usually leads to a Herbrand disjunction of unspecified length”

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Linear logic does not deal with contractions, simply avoids it!

Herbrand theorem : Example

Theorem (A)

$$\exists n(P(n) \rightarrow P(n + 1))$$



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Proof.

Assume $\forall n(P(n) \wedge \neg P(n+1))$, then we have both

- $P(0) \wedge \neg P(1)$
- $P(1) \wedge \neg P(2)$

which implies \perp . Hence $\exists n(P(n) \rightarrow P(n+1))$. □

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Theorem (A⁺)

$$(P(0) \rightarrow P(1)) \vee (P(1) \rightarrow P(2))$$



Intuitionistic version

Theorem (B)

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Theorem (B⁺)

$$\neg ((P(0) \wedge \neg P(1)) \wedge (P(1) \wedge \neg P(2)))$$



Proof analysis

- Classically

$$\exists x A(x) \implies A(t_0) \vee \dots \vee A(t_n)$$

- Intuitionistically

$$\neg \forall x A(x) \implies \neg (A(t_0) \wedge \dots \wedge A(t_n))$$

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$$\forall x A(x) \rightarrow B \implies (A(t_0) \wedge \dots \wedge A(t_n)) \rightarrow B$$



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Direct interpretation

$|A|^{\vec{x}} \equiv \vec{x}$ is a **witness** for A , or \vec{x} realizes A

$$|A \wedge B|^{\vec{x}, \vec{y}} \quad :\equiv \quad |A|^{\vec{x}} \wedge |B|^{\vec{y}}$$

$$|A \vee B|^{\vec{x}, \vec{y}, b} \quad :\equiv \quad |A|^{\vec{x}} \vee_b |B|^{\vec{y}}$$

$$|A \rightarrow B|^{\vec{f}} \quad :\equiv \quad \forall \vec{x} (|A|^{\vec{x}} \rightarrow |B|^{\vec{f}\vec{x}})$$

$$|\forall z A(z)|^{\vec{f}} \quad :\equiv \quad \forall z (|A(z)|^{\vec{f}z})$$

$$|\exists z A(z)|^{\vec{x}, z} \quad :\equiv \quad |A(z)|^{\vec{x}}$$

$A \vee_b B \equiv$ if b then A else B

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$A \vee_b B \equiv$ if b then A else B

$|A \rightarrow A \wedge A|^{\lambda x. \langle x, x \rangle}$, i.e. $\lambda x. \langle x, x \rangle$ witnesses $A \rightarrow A \wedge A$



Non-linear negation

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some set of consequences of A is inconsistent

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Non-linear negation

- $A \rightarrow \perp$ $(A \wedge \dots \wedge A \rightarrow \perp)$
some set of consequences of A is inconsistent
- Made precise via the notion of **counter-example**:

Witness for $A \rightarrow \perp$ consists of a (unspecified but finite) collection of **counter-examples** for A

Generalised interpretation

- $\forall \vec{y} |A|_{\vec{y}}^{\vec{x}} \equiv \vec{x}$ is a **witness** for A
- $\neg |A|_{\vec{y}}^{\vec{x}} \equiv \vec{y}$ is a **counter-example** to the witness \vec{x}

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$$|A \rightarrow B|_{\vec{x}, \vec{w}}^{\vec{f}, \vec{g}} \equiv \forall \vec{y} \in \vec{g} \vec{x} \vec{w} |A|_{\vec{y}}^{\vec{x}} \rightarrow |B|_{\vec{w}}^{\vec{f} \vec{x}}$$

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- (Diller-Nahm'74)

$$|A \rightarrow B|_{\vec{x}, \vec{w}}^{\vec{f}, \vec{g}} \equiv \forall \vec{y} \in \vec{g}\vec{x}\vec{w} |A|_{\vec{y}}^{\vec{x}} \rightarrow |B|_{\vec{w}}^{\vec{f}\vec{x}}$$

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- (Dialectica'58)

$$|A \rightarrow B|_{\vec{x}, \vec{w}}^{\vec{f}, \vec{g}} \equiv |A|_{\vec{g}\vec{x}\vec{w}}^{\vec{x}} \rightarrow |B|_{\vec{w}}^{\vec{f}\vec{x}}$$

If $|A|$ decidable then $\forall \vec{y} \in \vec{g}\vec{x}\vec{w} |A|_{\vec{y}}^{\vec{x}}$ equivalent to $|A|_{\vec{g}\vec{x}\vec{w}}^{\vec{x}}$



Generalised interpretation

- (Diller-Nahm'74)

$$\forall \vec{y} \in \{\vec{y}_0, \vec{y}_1\} |A|_{\vec{y}}^{\vec{x}} \rightarrow |A|_{\vec{y}_0}^{\vec{x}} \wedge |A|_{\vec{y}_1}^{\vec{x}}$$

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- (Dialectica'58)

$$|A|_{C_{|A|}(\vec{y}_0, \vec{y}_1)}^{\vec{x}} \rightarrow |A|_{\vec{y}_0}^{\vec{x}} \wedge |A|_{\vec{y}_1}^{\vec{x}}$$

where

$$C_{|A|}(\vec{y}_0, \vec{y}_1) := \begin{cases} \vec{y}_0 & \text{if } \neg |A|_{\vec{y}_0}^{\vec{x}} \\ \vec{y}_1 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

Generalised interpretation and MP

- Markov Principle

$$\neg \forall x P(x) \rightarrow \exists x \neg P(x)$$

Interpreted by Dialectica (under decidability condition)

Generalised interpretation and MP

- Markov Principle

$$\neg\forall xP(x) \rightarrow \exists x\neg P(x)$$

Interpreted by Dialectica (under decidability condition)

- a weaker (but more natural) MP

$$\neg\forall xP(x) \rightarrow \exists s\neg\forall x \in s P(x)$$

is interpreted by Diller-Nahm



Other functional interpretations

1978. Stein's family of functional interpretations

- *Relate modified realizability and Diller-Nahm's*

1992. Monotone functional interpretation (Kohlenbach)

- *Proof mining*

2005. Bounded functional interpretation (Ferreira & O.)

- *Conservation results in feasible analysis*

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Parametrised functional interpretation

- $|A \rightarrow B|_{\vec{x}, \vec{w}}^{\vec{f}, \vec{g}} := \forall \vec{y} \sqsubset \vec{g}\vec{x}\vec{w} |A|_{\vec{y}}^{\vec{x}} \rightarrow |B|_{\vec{w}}^{\vec{f}\vec{x}}$



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Functional interpretations and proof mining

- Semi-classical proofs
 - Markov principle
 - Independence of premise
- Analytical proofs
 - (intuitionistic) axiom of choice
- $(\forall \rightarrow \forall)$ -theorem
 - Unique approximation
 $\bigwedge_{i=0}^1 \|x_i - c\| = \text{dist} \rightarrow x_0 = x_1$
 - Convex
 $\|1/2(x_0 + x_1)\| = 1 \rightarrow x_0 = x_1$
 - Function
 $x_0 = x_1 \rightarrow f(x_0) = f(x_1)$



Future work

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- Functional interpretation as tool of logic, not arithmetic
- Applications to mathematics and CS
 - Arithmetic?
 - Linearity, complexity?

