Abstract. This paper develops an inductive theory of predictive common sense reasoning. The theory provides the basis for an integrated solution to the three traditional problems of reasoning about change; the frame, qualification, and ramification problems. The theory is also capable of representing non-deterministic events, and it provides a means for stating defeasible preferences over the outcomes of conflicting simultaneous events.
Abstract. Causation is defined recursively. Event e is the cause of condition p in context c iff (1) e is the only sufficient cause of p in c, and (2) removing e from c either removes p or results in some other event causing p. A logical language is then developed, in which it is possible to represent and reason about actual and counterfactual events in partial evolving contexts. Axiomatic theories of events and causation are given, and a formal pragmatics is defined, making it possible to reason formally about particular cases. By way of illustration, examples involving preemption and trumping preemption are given.
Abstract. Recently I suggested that a cause is an event which, in its context of occurrence, is both necessary and sufficient for the effect. However this definition is only appropriate if there is a single potential cause of the effect. Consequently I suggest a generalization of the definition and discuss the resulting ``Production Theory''. I suggest that this can be seen as a combination of a regularity theory in the Hume tradition and a dependence theory in the Lewis tradition, and argue that the Production Theory inherits the strengths of the component theories while avoiding their weaknesses.
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