Nash Equilibrium Bekič's Lemma Backtracking and Bar Recursion

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Outline

- Nash Equilibrium
- 2 Bekič's Lemma
- Seight Queens Problem
- Bar Recursion
- Product of Selection Functions

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- 1 Nash Equilibrium
- 2 Bekič's Lemma
- 3 Eight Queens Problem
- 4 Bar Recursion
- 5 Product of Selection Functions

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- each player trying to maximise his own payoff

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
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
$$\mathsf{next}_i \colon X_1 \times \ldots \times X_{i-1} \to X_i$$

- strategy profile is a tuple $(next_i)_{1 \le i \le n}$
- A strategy profile is in (Nash) equilibrium if no single player has an incentive to unilaterally change his strategy


Three players, payoff function $q\colon X\times Y\times Z\to \mathbb{R}^3$ Each player is trying to maximise their own payoff




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find $x \in X_i$ where $p \colon X_i \to \mathbb{R}^n$ has maximal i-value

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fix payoff function $q \colon \prod_{i=1}^n X_i \to \mathbb{R}^n$

$$\mathsf{BI}(s) \stackrel{\Pi_{j>|s|}X_j}{=} \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} [] & \text{if } |s| = n \\ c_s * \mathsf{BI}(s * c_s) & \text{if } |s| < n \end{array} \right.$$

where $c_s = \operatorname{argmax}_{|s|+1}(\lambda x. q(s*x*Bl(s*x)))$



Equilibrium Strategy Profile

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where $c_s = \operatorname{argmax}_{|s|+1}(\lambda x. q(s * x * \mathsf{BI}(s * x)))$

Each player's **optimal strategy** can be described as

$$\mathsf{next}_i(s) = \underset{p: X_i \to \mathbb{R}^n}{\operatorname{argmax}_i(\underbrace{\lambda x. q(s * x * \mathsf{BI}(s * x))}_{p: X_i \to \mathbb{R}^n})}$$

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Bekič's Lemma

A mapping fix: $(X \to X) \to X$ is a **fixed point operator** if p(fix p) = fix p

for all $p \colon X \to X$

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$\mathsf{Theorem}$

If each space X_i has a fixed point operator

$$fix_i : (X_i \to X_i) \to X_i$$

then so does the product space $X_1 \times \ldots \times X_n$

 $\text{BL}\colon \Pi_{j\leq i}X_j\to \Pi_{j>i}X_j$ fixed point over $\Pi_{j>i}X_j$ assuming $s\colon \Pi_{j\leq i}X_j$ fixed

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$$\label{eq:sigma} \begin{split} \widetilde{\mathsf{fix}}_i \colon (X_i \to \Pi_{j=1}^n X_j) \to X_i \\ \text{find an } i\text{-fixed point of mappings } X_i \to \Pi_{j=1}^n X_j \end{split}$$

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given
$$q \colon \prod_{i=1}^n X_i \to \prod_{i=1}^n X_i$$

$$\mathsf{BL}(s) \stackrel{\Pi_{j > |s|} X_j}{=} \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} [\] & \text{if } |s| = n \\ c_s * \mathsf{BL}(s * c_s) & \text{if } |s| < n \end{array} \right.$$

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Hence, a fixed point of q is


$$\mathsf{BL}([\,])=[x_1,\ldots,x_n]$$

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
The Problem

Place eight queens on chess board so none capture the other



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
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The Problem

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 $q \colon \mathbf{8}^8 \to \mathbb{B}$ checks whether solution is correct

Construction by Exhaustive Search

 $\mathsf{EQ} \colon \mathbf{8}^i \to \mathbf{8}^{8-i}$

placement of remaining queens assuming the first \emph{i} are fixed

Construction by Exhaustive Search

EQ: $8^i \rightarrow 8^{8-i}$ placement of remaining queens assuming the first i are fixed

$$\varepsilon \colon (\mathbf{8} \to \mathbb{B}) \to \mathbf{8}$$

find $i \in \mathbf{8}$ such that p(i) is true (if one exists)

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given $q \colon \mathbf{8}^8 \to \mathbb{B}$ (checking correctness of proposed solution)

$$\mathsf{EQ}(s) \overset{\mathbf{8}^{8-|s|}}{=} \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} [] & \text{if } |s| = n \\ c_s * \mathsf{EQ}(s * c_s) & \text{if } |s| < n \end{array} \right.$$

where $c_s = \varepsilon(\lambda x. q(s * x * \mathsf{EQ}(s * x)))$



Eight Queens - Solution

Let

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A solution to the problem is given as

$$\mathsf{EQ}([\,])=[x_1,\ldots,x_n]$$

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Interpreting Finite Choice

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Problem

Given $\varepsilon_i \colon (X \to R) \to X$ such that

$$\forall i \le n \forall p A_i(\varepsilon_i p, p(\varepsilon_i p))$$

and $q: X^n \to R$ produce $s: X^n$ such that

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given "counter-example function" $q \colon X^n \to R$

$$\mathsf{BR}(s) \stackrel{X^{|s|-n}}{=} \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} [\] & \text{if } |s| = n \\ c_s * \mathsf{BR}(s * c_s) & \text{if } |s| < n \end{array} \right.$$

where $c_s = \varepsilon_{|s|+1}(\lambda x.q(s*x*BR(s*x)))$

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Take

$$s = \mathsf{BR}([\])$$

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Let

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Define

$$\mathsf{BR}_s(\omega)(\varepsilon)(q) \stackrel{X^*}{=} \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} [] & \text{if } |s| > \omega(\hat{s}) \\ c * \mathsf{BR}_{s*c}(\omega)(\varepsilon)(q) & \text{otherwise} \end{array} \right.$$

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$$\mathsf{EPS}_s(\omega)(\varepsilon)(q) \stackrel{X^*}{=} \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} [] & \text{if } |s| > \omega(\hat{s}) \\ c * \mathsf{EPS}_{s*c}(\omega)(\varepsilon)(q) & \text{otherwise} \end{array} \right.$$

where
$$c = \varepsilon_s(\lambda x. q(s * x * \mathsf{EPS}_{s*x}(\omega)(\varepsilon)(q)))$$

This is actually the **iterated product of selection functions** T-equivalent to Spector's restricted form of bar recursion

Given
$$\otimes : J_R X \times (X \to J_R Y) \to J_R (X \times Y)$$

Controlled product of selection functions

$$\mathsf{EPS}_s(\omega)(\varepsilon) \stackrel{J_RX^*}{=} \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} \lambda q.[\,] & \text{if } |s| > \omega(\hat{s}) \\ \varepsilon_s \otimes (\lambda x. \mathsf{EPS}_{s*x}(\omega)(\varepsilon)) & \text{otherwise} \end{array} \right.$$

EPS gives direct realisers as

• $\lambda \varepsilon, q, n. \mathsf{EPS}_{[]}(n)(\varepsilon)(q)$ realises

FC:
$$\forall n(\forall i \leq n \exists x A_i(x) \rightarrow \exists s \forall i \leq n A_i(s_i))$$

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$$\mathbf{IPP} \ : \ \forall n \forall c^{\mathbb{N} \to n} \exists i \leq n(c^{-1}(i) \text{ infinite})$$

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 $\bullet \ \lambda \varepsilon, q, \omega. \mathsf{EPS}_{[]}(\omega)(\tilde{\varepsilon})(q) \ \mathsf{realises} \quad \left(\tilde{\varepsilon}_s = \varepsilon_{|s|}\right)$

$$\mathbf{AC}_0 : \forall n \exists x A_n(x) \to \exists \alpha \forall n A_n(\alpha(n))$$

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DC:
$$\forall s \exists x A_s(x) \rightarrow \exists \alpha \forall n A_{\overline{\alpha}n}(\alpha(n))$$

Further Information

- M. Escardó and P. Oliva
 Selection functions, bar recursion and backward induction
 MSCS, 20(2):127-168, 2010
- M. Escardó and P. Oliva Sequential games and optimal strategies Proceedings of the Royal Society A, 2011
- P. Oliva and T. Powell
 On Spector's bar recursion
 Final draft available