

Selection Functions and Attainable Quantifiers

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LogIC Seminar, Imperial College

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Outline

- 1 Generalised Quantifiers
- 2 Selection Functions
- 3 Algorithms
- 4 Game Theory
- 5 Proof Theory



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Usual quantifiers

$$\exists, \forall : (X \rightarrow \mathbb{B}) \rightarrow \mathbb{B}$$

Usual quantifiers

$$\exists, \forall : (X \rightarrow R) \rightarrow R$$

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$$\exists, \forall : (X \rightarrow R) \rightarrow R$$

Other operations of this type are

X	R	Operation
\mathbb{N}	Y	Limit \lim
$[0, 1]$	\mathbb{R}	Supremum \sup
$[0, 1]$	\mathbb{R}	Integration \int
Y	Y	Fixed point operator fix_Y



Definition (Generalised Quantifiers)

Let us call operations ϕ of type

$$(X \rightarrow R) \rightarrow R$$

generalised quantifiers. Abbreviate $KX := (X \rightarrow R) \rightarrow R$.

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Let us call operations ϕ of type

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generalised quantifiers. Abbreviate $KX \equiv (X \rightarrow R) \rightarrow R$.

Definition (Product of Generalised Quantifiers)

Given quantifiers $\phi: KX$ and $\psi: KY$ define a quantifier $\phi \otimes \psi: K(X \times Y)$ as

$$(\phi \otimes \psi)(p) \stackrel{R}{\equiv} \phi(\lambda x^X. \psi(\lambda y^Y. p(x, y)))$$

where $p: X \times Y \rightarrow R$.



Generalised Quantifiers

What does

$$(\phi \otimes \psi)(p) \stackrel{R}{\equiv} \phi(\lambda x^X. \psi(\lambda y^Y. p(x, y)))$$

mean?

Generalised Quantifiers

What does

$$(\phi \otimes \psi)(p) \stackrel{\mathbb{R}}{=} \phi(\lambda x^X . \psi(\lambda y^Y . p(x, y)))$$

mean?

Exactly what you would expect, namely

$$(\exists_X \otimes \forall_Y)(p^{X \times Y \rightarrow \mathbb{B}}) \stackrel{\mathbb{B}}{=} \exists x^X \forall y^Y p(x, y)$$

$$(\sup \otimes \int)(p^{[0,1]^2 \rightarrow \mathbb{R}}) \stackrel{\mathbb{R}}{=} \sup_x \int_0^1 p(x, y) dy$$



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Theorem (Mean Value Theorem)

For any $p: C[0, 1]$ there is a point $a \in [0, 1]$ such that

$$\int_0^1 p = p(a)$$

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Theorem (Supremum Theorem)

For any $p: C[0, 1]$ there is a point $a \in [0, 1]$ such that

$$\sup p = p(a)$$

Theorem (Witness Theorem)

For any $p: X \rightarrow \mathbb{B}$ there is a point $a \in X$ such that

$$\exists x^X p(x) \Leftrightarrow p(a)$$

(similar to Hilbert's ε -term).

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Theorem (Counter-example Theorem)

For any $p: X \rightarrow \mathbb{B}$ there is a point $a \in X$ such that

$$\forall x^X p(x) \Leftrightarrow p(a)$$

(aka "Drinker's paradox").

Let $JX \equiv (X \rightarrow R) \rightarrow X$.

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Definition (Selection Functions)

A function $\varepsilon: JX$ is called a *selection function* for $\phi: KX$ if

$$\phi(p) = p(\varepsilon p)$$

holds for all $p: X \rightarrow R$.

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Definition (Attainable Quantifiers)

A generalised quantifier $\phi: KX$ is called *attainable* if it has a *selection function*.

For Instance

Any fixed point operator

$$\text{fix} : (X \rightarrow X) \rightarrow X$$

is an attainable quantifier, and a selection function.

In fact,

$$\text{fix } p = p(\text{fix } p)$$

says that `fix` is its own selection function.

A Mapping $J \mapsto K$

Not all quantifiers are attainable, but every element

$$\varepsilon : JX$$

is a selection function for some attainable quantifier, namely

$$\bar{\varepsilon} : KX$$

defined as

$$\bar{\varepsilon}p = p(\varepsilon p).$$

So, we call elements $\varepsilon : JX$ “selection functions”.

Questions

Is “being attainable” closed under finite product?

What about countable product?

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What about countable product?

Yes! Let us define a product of selection functions such that

$$\overline{\varepsilon \otimes \delta} = \bar{\varepsilon} \otimes \bar{\delta}$$



Definition (Product of Selection Functions)

Given selection functions $\varepsilon: JX$ and $\delta: JY$ define a selection function on the product space $X \times Y$ as

$$(\varepsilon \otimes \delta)(p^{X \times Y \rightarrow R}) \stackrel{X \times Y}{:=} (a, b(a))$$

where

$$a = \varepsilon(\lambda x. p(x, b(x)))$$

$$b(x) = \delta(\lambda y. p(x, y)).$$

For instance: Quantifier Elimination

Suppose $\exists p = p(\varepsilon p)$ and $\forall p = p(\delta p)$.

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Suppose $\exists p = p(\varepsilon p)$ and $\forall p = p(\delta p)$. Then

$$\begin{aligned}\exists x \forall y p(x, y) &= \exists x p(x, b(x)) \\ &= p(a, b(a))\end{aligned}$$

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
where

$$\begin{aligned}b(x) &= \delta(\lambda y. p(x, y)) \\ a &= \varepsilon(\lambda x. p(x, b(x))).\end{aligned}$$

In fact, $(\varepsilon \otimes \delta)(p) = (a, b(a))$.


Product of Selection Functions

$$p: X \times Y \rightarrow R$$




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
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
Bekic's lemma

Lemma

If X and Y have fixed point operators then so does $X \times Y$.


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
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


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Backtracking


good: $X \times Y \rightarrow \mathbb{B}$



Generic algorithm has type $(X \times Y \rightarrow \mathbb{B}) \rightarrow X \times Y$.

Backtracking


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
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Eight Queens Problem

```
 $\varepsilon(p)$  {  
  for ( $i := 1; i \leq 8; i++$ ) do  
    if  $p(i)$  return  $i$   
  return 1  
}
```

[$\varepsilon : (8 \rightarrow \mathbb{B}) \rightarrow 8$]



Eight Queens Problem

$$\varepsilon(p) \{ \quad [\varepsilon : (8 \rightarrow \mathbb{B}) \rightarrow 8]$$

for $(i := 1; i \leq 8; i++)$ do

if $p(i)$ return i

return 1

$$\}$$

$$\text{sol}_i(x_1, \dots, x_{i-1}) \{ \quad [\text{sol}_i : 8^{i-1} \rightarrow 8^{9-i}]$$

if $i = 9$ return $\langle \rangle$

else

$y := \varepsilon(\lambda i. \text{good}(\text{sol}_{i+1}(x_1, \dots, x_{i-1}, i)))$

return $y * \text{sol}_{i+1}(x_1, \dots, x_{i-1}, y)$

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$$\langle x_1, \dots, x_8 \rangle := \text{sol}_1()$$


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good: $8^8 \rightarrow \mathbb{B}$ checks if argument is solution to 8QP.



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Selection function

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finds argument $\varepsilon p \in 8$ such that $p(\varepsilon p)$ holds



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Selection function

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$$\text{sol}_1(\cdot) = \left(\bigotimes_{i=1}^8 \varepsilon \right) (\text{good})$$


calculates a solution to 8 queen problem.

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
Nash equilibrium (for sequential games)

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Backward Induction

Let $f: \prod_{i=1}^n X_i \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^n$ be a payoff function

$$\operatorname{argmax}_i(p) \left\{ \begin{array}{l} [\operatorname{argmax}_i: (X_i \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^n) \rightarrow X_i] \\ \text{for } (x \in X_i) \text{ do} \\ \quad \text{if } p(x) \text{ has maximal } i\text{-coordinate return } x \\ \end{array} \right\}$$

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$$\operatorname{sol}_i(x_1, \dots, x_{i-1}) \left\{ \begin{array}{l} [\operatorname{sol}_i: \prod_{k=1}^{i-1} X_k \rightarrow \prod_{k=i}^n X_k] \\ \text{if } i = n + 1 \text{ return } \langle \rangle \\ \text{else} \\ \quad y := \operatorname{argmax}_i(\lambda x. f(\operatorname{sol}_{i+1}(x_1, \dots, x_{i-1}, x))) \\ \quad \text{return } y * \operatorname{sol}_{i+1}(x_1, \dots, x_{i-1}, y) \end{array} \right\}$$


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$$\langle x_1, \dots, x_n \rangle := \operatorname{sol}_1()$$

Backward Induction

Payoff function $f: \prod_{i=1}^n X_i \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^n$

Each selection function

$$\operatorname{argmax}_i: (X_i \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^n) \rightarrow X_i$$

finds a point where the argument is i -maximal

Product

$$\operatorname{sol}_1(\cdot) = \left(\bigotimes_{i=1}^n \operatorname{argmax}_i \right) (f)$$

calculates a strategy profile in Nash equilibrium.

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Analysis

Mathematical analysis is based on **comprehension**

$$\exists f \forall n (f n = 0 \leftrightarrow A(n)).$$

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Comprehension follows classically from **countable choice**

$$\forall n \exists b A(n, b) \rightarrow \exists f \forall n A(n, f n).$$

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Countable choice is classically computational up to **DNS**

$$\forall n \neg \neg A(n) \rightarrow \neg \neg \forall n A(n).$$



Double negation shift

The double negation shift **DNS**

$$\forall n \neg\neg A(n) \rightarrow \neg\neg \forall n A(n)$$

corresponds to the type

$$\prod_n ((A_n \rightarrow \perp) \rightarrow \perp) \rightarrow (\prod_n A_n \rightarrow \perp) \rightarrow \perp .$$

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If $\perp \rightarrow A_n$, this is equivalent to

$$\prod_n ((A_n \rightarrow \perp) \rightarrow A_n) \rightarrow (\prod_n A_n \rightarrow \perp) \rightarrow \prod_n A_n$$

i.e. $\prod_n J(A_n) \rightarrow J(\prod_n A_n)$.

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The type of the **countable product** of selection functions!

Bar recursion

Bar recursion does precisely that, i.e. it can be viewed as

$$\bigotimes_n \varepsilon = \varepsilon_n \otimes \bigotimes_{n+1} (\varepsilon).$$

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Spector's bar recursive solution to consistency of analysis is

$$\bigotimes_s(\varepsilon) = \begin{cases} \mathbf{0} & \text{if } \omega_s(\mathbf{0}) < |s| \\ \varepsilon_s \otimes \lambda x. (\bigotimes_{s*x}(\varepsilon)) & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

Not Mentioned but Very Interesting

- Connection to **classical logic**
Finite product of quantifiers witnesses dialectica interpretation of IPHP
- General notion of **game**
Optimal strategies as products of selection functions
History dependent games, dependent products
- Relation to **monads**
 K, J are strong monads, $\varepsilon \mapsto \bar{\varepsilon}$ a monad morphism



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For more information see:

Selection functions, bar recursion and backward induction

M. Escardo and P. Oliva, MSCS, to appear.

