# Selection Functions, Bar Recursion and Nash Equilibrium 

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## Outline

(1) Generalised Quantifiers
(2) Selection Functions
(3) Backward Induction
(4) Bar Recursion

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(1) Generalised Quantifiers
(2) Selection Functions

3 Backward Induction
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## Usual quantifiers

$$
\exists_{X}, \forall_{X}:(X \rightarrow \mathbb{B}) \rightarrow \mathbb{B}
$$

Usual quantifiers $(R=\mathbb{B})$

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Some operations of this type:

| Operation | $\phi:$ | $(X \rightarrow R) \rightarrow R$ |
| :--- | ---: | :--- | ---: |
| Quantifiers | $\forall_{X}, \exists_{X}:$ | $(X \rightarrow \mathbb{B}) \rightarrow \mathbb{B}$ |
| Integration | $\int_{0}^{1}:$ | $([0,1] \rightarrow \mathbb{R}) \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ |
| Supremum | $\sup _{[0,1]}:$ | $([0,1] \rightarrow \mathbb{R}) \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ |
| Limit | $\lim :$ | $(\mathbb{N} \rightarrow R) \rightarrow R$ |
| Fixed point operator | $\operatorname{fix}_{X}:$ | $(X \rightarrow X) \rightarrow X$ |

## Definition (Generalised Quantifiers)

Let us call operations $\phi$ of type

$$
(X \rightarrow R) \rightarrow R
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generalised quantifiers. Write $K_{R} X: \equiv(X \rightarrow R) \rightarrow R$.

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## Definition (Product of Generalised Quantifiers)

Given quantifiers $\phi: K_{R} X$ and $\psi: K_{R} Y$ define the product quantifier $\phi \otimes \psi: K_{R}(X \times Y)$ as

$$
(\phi \otimes \psi)(p): \stackrel{R}{\equiv} \phi\left(\lambda x^{X} . \psi\left(\lambda y^{Y} . p(x, y)\right)\right)
$$

where $p: X \times Y \rightarrow R$.

## Generalised Quantifiers

What does

$$
(\phi \otimes \psi)(p): \stackrel{R}{\equiv} \phi\left(\lambda x^{X} . \psi\left(\lambda y^{Y} . p(x, y)\right)\right)
$$

mean?

## Generalised Quantifiers

What does

$$
(\phi \otimes \psi)(p): \stackrel{R}{=} \phi\left(\lambda x^{X} \cdot \psi\left(\lambda y^{Y} \cdot p(x, y)\right)\right)
$$

mean?
Exactly what you would expect, namely

$$
\begin{array}{ll}
\left(\exists_{X} \otimes \forall_{Y}\right)\left(p^{X \times Y \rightarrow \mathbb{B}}\right) & \stackrel{\mathbb{R}}{=} \exists x^{X} \forall y^{Y} p(x, y) \\
\left(\sup \otimes \int\right)\left(p^{[0,1]^{2} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}}\right) & \stackrel{\mathbb{R}}{=} \sup _{x} \int_{0}^{1} p(x, y) d y
\end{array}
$$

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## Theorem (Mean Value Theorem)

For any $p \in C[0,1]$ there is a point $a \in[0,1]$ such that

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\int_{0}^{1} p=p(a)
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$$

## Theorem (Maximum Theorem)

For any $p \in C[0,1]$ there is a point $a \in[0,1]$ such that

$$
\sup p=p(a)
$$

## Theorem (Witness Theorem)

For any $p: X \rightarrow \mathbb{B}$ there is a point $a \in X$ such that

$$
\exists x^{X} p(x) \Leftrightarrow p(a)
$$

(similar to Hilbert's $\varepsilon$-term).

## Theorem (Witness Theorem)

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## Theorem (Counter-example Theorem)

For any $p: X \rightarrow \mathbb{B}$ there is a point $a \in X$ such that

$$
\forall x^{X} p(x) \Leftrightarrow p(a)
$$

(aka "Drinker's paradox").

Let $J_{R} X: \equiv(X \rightarrow R) \rightarrow X$.

## Let $J_{R} X: \equiv(X \rightarrow R) \rightarrow X$.

## Definition (Selection Functions)

$\varepsilon: J_{R} X$ is called a selection function for $\phi: K_{R} X$ if

$$
\phi(p)=p(\varepsilon p)
$$

holds for all $p: X \rightarrow R$.

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## Definition (Attainable Quantifiers)

A generalised quantifier $\phi: K_{R} X$ is called attainable if it has a selection function $\varepsilon: J_{R} X$.

## For Instance

Any fixed point operator

$$
\text { fix : } \quad(X \rightarrow X) \rightarrow X
$$

is an attainable quantifier, and a selection function.

In fact, the fixed point equation

$$
\mathrm{fix} p=p(\mathrm{fix} p)
$$

says that fix is its own selection function.

## A Mapping $J_{R} \mapsto K_{R}$

Not all quantifiers are attainable, but every element

$$
\varepsilon: J_{R} X
$$

is a selection function for some attainable quantifier, namely

$$
\bar{\varepsilon}: \quad K_{R} X
$$

defined as

$$
\bar{\varepsilon} p: \frac{R}{=} p(\varepsilon p) .
$$

So, we call all elements $\varepsilon: J X$ "selection functions".

## Questions

Is "being attainable" closed under finite product?
What about countable product?

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Is "being attainable" closed under finite product?
What about countable product?
Yes! We define a product of selection functions such that

$$
\overline{\varepsilon \otimes \delta}=\bar{\varepsilon} \otimes \bar{\delta}
$$

## Definition (Product of Selection Functions)

Given selection functions $\varepsilon: J_{R} X$ and $\delta: J_{R} Y$ define a product selection function

$$
\varepsilon \otimes \delta: \quad J_{R}(X \times Y)
$$

as

$$
(\varepsilon \otimes \delta)\left(p^{X \times Y \rightarrow R}\right) \stackrel{X \times Y}{:=}(a, b(a))
$$

where

$$
\begin{aligned}
a & :=\varepsilon(\lambda x \cdot p(x, b(x))) \\
b(x) & :=\delta(\lambda y \cdot p(x, y))
\end{aligned}
$$

## Product of Selection Functions

$$
p: X \times Y \rightarrow R
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## Quantifier Elimination

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$$

In fact, $(\varepsilon \otimes \varepsilon)(p)=(a, b(a))$.

## Bekic's lemma

Lemma
If $X$ and $Y$ have fixed point operators then so does $X \times Y$.

## Bekic's lemma

$$
p: X \times Y \rightarrow X \times Y
$$


fix $_{Y}$


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## Nash equilibrium (simultaneous games)

- $n$ players, each with a set of "strategies" $X_{i}$
- payoff function $f: \Pi_{i=0}^{n-1} X_{i} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^{n}$
- strategy profile $\left(x_{0}, \ldots, x_{n-1}\right): \Pi_{i=0}^{n-1} X_{i}$


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- strategy profile $\left(x_{0}, \ldots, x_{n-1}\right): \prod_{i=0}^{n-1} X_{i}$
- equilibrium strategy profile if for $i=0, \ldots, n-1$ $\forall x_{i}^{*}\left(f_{i}\left(x_{0}, \ldots, x_{i}^{*}, \ldots, x_{n-1}\right) \leq f_{i}\left(x_{0}, \ldots, x_{i}, \ldots, x_{n-1}\right)\right)$


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$$

- pure equilibria not always exist, but mixed ones do
- consider, however, that the game is played sequentially


## Nash equilibrium (for sequential games)

E.g. three players, payoff function $f: X \times Y \times Z \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^{3}$


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## Backward Induction

Selection functions in this case are

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \operatorname{argmax}_{i}(p)\left\{\quad\left[\operatorname{argmax}_{i}:\left(X_{i} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^{n}\right) \rightarrow X_{i}\right]\right. \\
& \quad \text { for }\left(x \in X_{i}\right) \text { do } \\
& \quad \text { if } p(x) \text { has maximal } i \text {-coordinate return } x \\
& \}
\end{aligned}
$$

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& \quad \text { if } p(x) \text { has maximal } i \text {-coordinate return } x \\
& \text { Product } \\
& \qquad\left(\bigotimes_{i=0}^{n-1} \operatorname{argmax}_{i}\right)(f)
\end{aligned}
$$

computes "optimal play", and can be used to calculate strategy profile in Nash equilibrium.

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## Bar recursion $=$ infinite product

Bar recursion is simply the countable iteration of product of selection functions and quantifiers!

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In other words, define infinite product as

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\bigotimes_{k}(\varepsilon)=\varepsilon_{k} \otimes\left(\bigotimes_{k+1}(\varepsilon)\right) .
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where $\varepsilon: \Pi_{k \in \mathbb{N}} J_{R}\left(X_{k}\right)$.

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where $\varepsilon: \Pi_{k \in \mathbb{N}} J_{R}\left(X_{k}\right)$.
Then (intuitively)

$$
\operatorname{BR}(\varepsilon, p, s)=\bigotimes_{|s|}(\varepsilon)\left(p_{s}\right) .
$$

## Two points

Point 1. Infinite products not always (uniquely) defined. Recursive equation uniquely defines a function in the model of continuous functionals.
But it does not on the full set theoretic model.

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Point 1. Infinite products not always (uniquely) defined. Recursive equation uniquely defines a function in the model of continuous functionals.
But it does not on the full set theoretic model.
Point 2. There are several variants of bar recursion, but only two binary products have been defined?
Product of quant. $\mapsto$ Spector BR [Spector'62]
Product of s.f. $\quad \mapsto$ Course-of-value BR [Escardo/O.'09]
Skewed product $\quad \mapsto$ Modified BR [Berger/O.'06]
Symmetric product $\mapsto$ BBC [Berardi et al'98]

## Spector Bar recursion

Iterated product of quantifiers

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in general fails to exist (even assuming continuity).

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Iterated product of quantifiers

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in general fails to exist (even assuming continuity).
Spector's original bar recursion corresponds to a "conditional" iterated product

$$
\bigotimes_{k}(\phi)(p) \stackrel{\mathbb{N}}{=} \begin{cases}p(\mathbf{0}) & \text { if } p(\mathbf{0})<k \\ \left(\phi_{k} \otimes\left(\bigotimes_{k+1}(\phi)\right)\right)(p) & \text { otherwise } .\end{cases}
$$

Ps.: Actually, Spector uses dependent products - c.f. paper.

## Double negation shift

The double negation shift DNS

$$
\forall n \neg \neg A(n) \rightarrow \neg \neg \forall n A(n)
$$

corresponds to the type

$$
\Pi_{n}\left(\left(A_{n} \rightarrow \perp\right) \rightarrow \perp\right) \rightarrow\left(\Pi_{n} A_{n} \rightarrow \perp\right) \rightarrow \perp .
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$$

If $\perp \rightarrow A_{n}$, this is equivalent to

$$
\Pi_{n}\left(\left(A_{n} \rightarrow \perp\right) \rightarrow A_{n}\right) \rightarrow\left(\Pi_{n} A_{n} \rightarrow \perp\right) \rightarrow \Pi_{n} A_{n}
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i.e. $\Pi_{n} J\left(A_{n}\right) \rightarrow J\left(\Pi_{n} A_{n}\right)$.

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i.e. $\Pi_{n} J\left(A_{n}\right) \rightarrow J\left(\Pi_{n} A_{n}\right)$.

The type of the countable product of selection functions!

## Not Mentioned but Very Interesting

- Connection to classical logic

Finite product of quantifiers witnesses dialectica interpretation of IPHP

- General notion of game

Optimal strategies as products of selection functions History dependent games, dependent products

- Relation to monads
$K, J$ are strong monads, $\varepsilon \mapsto \bar{\varepsilon}$ a monad morphism
- Interdefinability between bar recursions
E.g. "normal" product $=$ "skewed" product


## For more information see:

Selection functions, bar recursion and backward induction M. Escardo and P. Oliva, Submitted, July 2009

Preprint available from my webpage.
Instances of bar recursion as iterated products of selection functions and quantifiers
M. Escardo and P. Oliva, In preparation.

