# Selection Functions, Bar Recursion and Nash Equilibrium

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British Logic Colloquium Swansea, 4 September 2009

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# Outline



2 Selection Functions







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#### Usual quantifiers

 $\exists_X, \forall_X : (X \to \mathbb{B}) \to \mathbb{B}$ 



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Some operations of this type:

Operation	$\phi$	:	$(X \to R) \to R$
Quantifiers	$\forall_X, \exists_X$	:	$(X \to \mathbb{B}) \to \mathbb{B}$
Integration	$\int_0^1$	:	$([0,1] \to \mathbb{R}) \to \mathbb{R}$
Supremum	$\sup_{[0,1]}$	:	$([0,1] \to \mathbb{R}) \to \mathbb{R}$
Limit	lim	:	$(\mathbb{N} \to R) \to R$
Fixed point operator	$fix_X$	:	$(X \to X) \to X$

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### Definition (Generalised Quantifiers)

Let us call operations  $\phi$  of type

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### Definition (Product of Generalised Quantifiers)

Given quantifiers  $\phi: K_R X$  and  $\psi: K_R Y$  define the **product** quantifier  $\phi \otimes \psi: K_R(X \times Y)$  as

$$(\phi \otimes \psi)(p) :\stackrel{R}{=} \phi(\lambda x^{X} . \psi(\lambda y^{Y} . p(x, y)))$$

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where  $p: X \times Y \to R$ .

# Generalised Quantifiers

### What does

$$(\phi \otimes \psi)(p) :\stackrel{R}{=} \phi(\lambda x^{X}.\psi(\lambda y^{Y}.p(x,y)))$$

mean?



# Generalised Quantifiers

#### What does

$$(\phi \otimes \psi)(p) \stackrel{R}{:=} \phi(\lambda x^X . \psi(\lambda y^Y . p(x, y)))$$

#### mean?

Exactly what you would expect, namely

$$(\exists_X \otimes \forall_Y) (p^{X \times Y \to \mathbb{B}}) \stackrel{\mathbb{B}}{\equiv} \exists x^X \forall y^Y p(x, y) (\sup \otimes \int) (p^{[0,1]^2 \to \mathbb{R}}) \stackrel{\mathbb{R}}{\equiv} \sup_x \int_0^1 p(x, y) dy$$



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#### Theorem (Maximum Theorem)

For any  $p \in C[0,1]$  there is a point  $a \in [0,1]$  such that  $\sup p = p(a)$ 



#### Theorem (Witness Theorem)

For any  $p: X \to \mathbb{B}$  there is a point  $a \in X$  such that

$$\exists x^X p(x) \iff p(a)$$

(similar to Hilbert's  $\varepsilon$ -term).



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#### Theorem (Counter-example Theorem)

For any  $p: X \to \mathbb{B}$  there is a point  $a \in X$  such that

 $\forall x^X p(x) \iff p(a)$ 

(aka "Drinker's paradox").

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#### Definition (Selection Functions)

 $\varepsilon$ :  $J_R X$  is called a **selection function** for  $\phi$ :  $K_R X$  if

$$\phi(p) = p(\varepsilon p)$$

holds for all  $p: X \to R$ .



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#### Definition (Attainable Quantifiers)

A generalised quantifier  $\phi: K_R X$  is called **attainable** if it has a selection function  $\varepsilon: J_R X$ .



### For Instance

Any fixed point operator

fix : 
$$(X \to X) \to X$$

is an attainable quantifier, and a selection function.

In fact, the fixed point equation

fix 
$$p = p(\text{fix } p)$$

says that fix is its own selection function.

A Mapping 
$$J_R \mapsto K_R$$

Not all quantifiers are attainable, but every element

 $\varepsilon$  :  $J_R X$ 

is a selection function for some attainable quantifier, namely

$$\overline{\varepsilon}$$
 :  $K_R X$ 

defined as

$$\overline{\varepsilon}p := p(\varepsilon p).$$

So, we call all elements  $\varepsilon$ : JX "selection functions".



Questions

Is "being attainable" closed under finite product? What about countable product?



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Yes! We define a product of selection functions such that

$$\overline{\varepsilon\otimes\delta}=\overline{\varepsilon}\otimes\overline{\delta}$$

#### Definition (Product of Selection Functions)

Given selection functions  $\varepsilon \colon J_R X$  and  $\delta \colon J_R Y$  define a product selection function

$$\varepsilon \otimes \delta$$
 :  $J_R(X \times Y)$ 


as

$$(\varepsilon \otimes \delta)(p^{X \times Y \to R}) \stackrel{X \times Y}{:=} (a, b(a))$$

$$a := \varepsilon(\lambda x.p(x,b(x)))$$
  
$$b(x) := \delta(\lambda y.p(x,y)).$$




## Product of Selection Functions






### Product of Selection Functions






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## Quantifier Elimination

Suppose  $\exists n \ p(\vec{v}, n) = p(\vec{v}, \varepsilon(\lambda n. p(\vec{v}, n))).$ 



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$$b(x) = \varepsilon(\lambda y.p(x,y))$$



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$$\begin{split} b(x) &= \varepsilon(\lambda y.p(x,y))\\ a &= \varepsilon(\lambda x.p(x,b(x))).\\ \end{split}$$
 In fact,  $(\varepsilon\otimes\varepsilon)(p) = (a,b(a)).$ 






Lemma

If X and Y have fixed point operators then so does  $X \times Y$ .




## Bekic's lemma

 $p\colon X\times Y\to X\times Y$ 




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Backward Induction

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2 Selection Functions







# Nash equilibrium (simultaneous games)

- n players, each with a set of "strategies"  $X_i$
- payoff function  $f: \prod_{i=0}^{n-1} X_i \to \mathbb{R}^n$
- strategy profile  $(x_0, \ldots, x_{n-1})$ :  $\prod_{i=0}^{n-1} X_i$



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- equilibrium strategy profile if for  $i = 0, \dots, n-1$  $\forall x_i^*(f_i(x_0, \dots, x_i^*, \dots, x_{n-1}) \leq f_i(x_0, \dots, x_i, \dots, x_{n-1}))$


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- pure equilibria not always exist, but mixed ones do
- consider, however, that the game is played sequentially

### Nash equilibrium (for sequential games)


E.g. three players, payoff function  $f: X \times Y \times Z \to \mathbb{R}^3$ 





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
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
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### Backward Induction

#### Selection functions in this case are

 $\begin{array}{ll} \operatorname{argmax}_{i}(p) \left\{ & \left[\operatorname{argmax}_{i} \colon (X_{i} \to \mathbb{R}^{n}) \to X_{i}\right] \\ \text{for } (x \in X_{i}) \text{ do} \\ & \text{if } p(x) \text{ has maximal } i\text{-coordinate return } x \end{array} \right\} \end{array}$ 



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```

Product

$$\left(\bigotimes_{i=0}^{n-1}\operatorname{argmax}_i\right)(f)$$

computes "optimal play", and can be used to calculate strategy profile in Nash equilibrium.



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**Bar recursion** is simply the countable iteration of product of selection functions and quantifiers!

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In other words, define infinite product as

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where  $\varepsilon \colon \prod_{k \in \mathbb{N}} J_R(X_k)$ .



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where  $\varepsilon \colon \prod_{k \in \mathbb{N}} J_R(X_k)$ .

Then (intuitively)

$$\mathsf{BR}(\varepsilon, p, s) = \bigotimes_{|s|} (\varepsilon)(p_s).$$

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# Two points

**Point 1**. Infinite products not always (uniquely) defined.

Recursive equation uniquely defines a function in the model of *continuous functionals*.

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But it does not on the full set theoretic model.

**Point 2**. There are several variants of bar recursion, but only two binary products have been defined?

**Product of quant.** → Spector BR [Spector'62]

- **Product of s.f.**  $\mapsto$  Course-of-value BR [Escardo/O.'09]
- Skewed product  $\mapsto$  Modified BR [Berger/O.'06]
- *Symmetric product* → BBC [Berardi et al'98]



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# Spector Bar recursion

Iterated product of quantifiers

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in general fails to exist (even assuming continuity).



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Iterated product of quantifiers

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in general fails to exist (even assuming continuity).

**Spector's original bar recursion** corresponds to a "conditional" iterated product

$$\bigotimes_{k} (\phi)(p) \stackrel{\mathbb{N}}{=} \begin{cases} p(\mathbf{0}) & \text{if } p(\mathbf{0}) < k \\ (\phi_{k} \otimes (\bigotimes_{k+1}(\phi)))(p) & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

Ps.: Actually, Spector uses dependent products - c.f. paper.

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### Double negation shift

The double negation shift  $\mathbf{DNS}$ 

$$\forall n \neg \neg A(n) \rightarrow \neg \neg \forall n A(n)$$

corresponds to the type

$$\Pi_n((A_n \to \bot) \to \bot) \to (\Pi_n A_n \to \bot) \to \bot.$$



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If  $\bot \to A_n$ , this is equivalent to

$$\Pi_n((A_n \to \bot) \to A_n) \to (\Pi_n A_n \to \bot) \to \Pi_n A_n$$
  
i.e. 
$$\Pi_n J(A_n) \to J(\Pi_n A_n).$$



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i.e.  $\Pi_n J(A_n) \to J(\Pi_n A_n).$ 

The type of the countable product of selection functions!

Selection Functions, Bar Recursion and Nash Equilibrium

#### Not Mentioned but Very Interesting

- Connection to **classical logic** Finite product of quantifiers witnesses dialectica interpretation of IPHP
- General notion of game
   Optimal strategies as products of selection functions
   History dependent games, dependent products
- Relation to monads

K, J are strong monads,  $\varepsilon \mapsto \overline{\varepsilon}$  a monad morphism

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Interdefinability between bar recursions
 E.g. "normal" product = "skewed" product

#### For more information see:

Selection functions, bar recursion and backward induction M. Escardo and P. Oliva, Submitted, July 2009 Preprint available from my webpage.

*Instances of bar recursion as iterated products of selection functions and quantifiers* 

M. Escardo and P. Oliva, In preparation.

